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GitHub · Developer toolsMay 19, 2026, 05:30 UTC

Incident with Copilot

InformationalCapacityUpdated 16h ago
May 19, 05:30 UTCMay 19, 05:30 UTC
Duration
0m
Impact
Informational
Root cause
Capacity
GitHub, 90 days
68 incidents
Affected
Not listed by the vendor.
Status page

Final update

On May 19, 2026, between 05:30 UTC and 14:50 UTC, some Copilot users experienced failures when using code completions, chat sessions, and cloud agent sessions. At peak impact, approximately 13% of Copilot API requests failed, and approximately 24% of remote sessions failed to initialize. A partial mitigation at 08:16 UTC reduced the Copilot API error rate to approximately 0.3%, but intermittent failures persisted until a full fix was deployed at 14:15 UTC and recovery was verified by 14:50 UTC. The incident was caused by rate limits being exceeded on a shared infrastructure component. A recently enabled feature increased call volume to this component, and the combined load exceeded capacity limits as traffic increased during business hours. We mitigated the incident by deploying a caching layer to reduce load on shared infrastructure. To prevent recurrence, we are separating rate limit scopes between services, adding monitoring for internal dependency rate limiting, and reducing redundant calls.

Timeline

  1. Resolved · May 19, 05:30 UTC
    On May 19, 2026, between 05:30 UTC and 14:50 UTC, some Copilot users experienced failures when using code completions, chat sessions, and cloud agent sessions. At peak impact, approximately 13% of Copilot API requests failed, and approximately 24% of remote sessions failed to initialize. A partial mitigation at 08:16 UTC reduced the Copilot API error rate to approximately 0.3%, but intermittent failures persisted until a full fix was deployed at 14:15 UTC and recovery was verified by 14:50 UTC. The incident was caused by rate limits being exceeded on a shared infrastructure component. A recently enabled feature increased call volume to this component, and the combined load exceeded capacity limits as traffic increased during business hours. We mitigated the incident by deploying a caching layer to reduce load on shared infrastructure. To prevent recurrence, we are separating rate limit scopes between services, adding monitoring for internal dependency rate limiting, and reducing redundant calls.

More from GitHub

Full history
StartedIncidentDuration
Sep 2310:11 UTCIncident across several servicesOngoing
Sep 2022:13 UTCIncident with Pull Requests1h 9m
Sep 1720:59 UTCElevated rate of errors for OpenAI models provided by Copilot50m
Sep 1607:20 UTCDegradation with Gemini 3.8 Flash10h 28m
Sep 1519:11 UTCDisruption with some GitHub services49m
Sep 1509:47 UTCDisruption with some GitHub services1h 30m

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All
StartedIncidentDuration
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Sep 221:44 UTCElevated Linux worker queue timesExpo21m
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Aug 2015:40 UTCWe are investigating an issue where customers may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products in the us-west1 region.Google Cloud3h 40m
Aug 1812:58 UTCINC20000163Snowflake1h 54m
Aug 1713:19 UTCNo capacity in ARNFly.io2h 22m

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