Degraded performance for various services
Final update
On March 13, 2026, between 13:35 UTC and 16:02 UTC, a configuration change to an internal authorization service reduced its processing capacity below what was needed during peak traffic. This caused intermittent timeouts when other GitHub services checked user permissions, resulting in four to five waves of errors over roughly two hours and forty minutes. In total, 0.4% of users were denied access to actions they were authorized to perform. The root cause was a resource right-sizing change deployed to the authorization service the previous day. It reduced CPU allocation below what was required at peak, causing the service's network gateway to throttle under load. Because the change was deployed after peak traffic on March 12, the reduced capacity wasn't surfaced until the next day's peak. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the authorization service and reverting the configuration change. To prevent recurrence, we are adding further resource utilization monitors across our entire stack to detect throttling and improving error handling so transient infrastructure timeouts are distinguished from authorization failures, enabling quicker detection of the root issue.
Timeline
- Resolved · Mar 13, 16:15 UTC
On March 13, 2026, between 13:35 UTC and 16:02 UTC, a configuration change to an internal authorization service reduced its processing capacity below what was needed during peak traffic. This caused intermittent timeouts when other GitHub services checked user permissions, resulting in four to five waves of errors over roughly two hours and forty minutes. In total, 0.4% of users were denied access to actions they were authorized to perform. The root cause was a resource right-sizing change deployed to the authorization service the previous day. It reduced CPU allocation below what was required at peak, causing the service's network gateway to throttle under load. Because the change was deployed after peak traffic on March 12, the reduced capacity wasn't surfaced until the next day's peak. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the authorization service and reverting the configuration change. To prevent recurrence, we are adding further resource utilization monitors across our entire stack to detect throttling and improving error handling so transient infrastructure timeouts are distinguished from authorization failures, enabling quicker detection of the root issue.
More from GitHub
Full history| Started | Incident | Impact | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 2310:11 UTC | Incident across several services | minor | Ongoing |
| Sep 2022:13 UTC | Incident with Pull Requests | minor | 1h 9m |
| Sep 1720:59 UTC | Elevated rate of errors for OpenAI models provided by Copilot | minor | 50m |
| Sep 1607:20 UTC | Degradation with Gemini 3.8 Flash | major | 10h 28m |
| Sep 1519:11 UTC | Disruption with some GitHub services | minor | 49m |
| Sep 1509:47 UTC | Disruption with some GitHub services | minor | 1h 30m |
Also caused by capacity and load
All| Started | Vendor | Incident | Impact | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 2213:19 UTC | We are investigating an issue with CH servers in Azure germanywestcentral region | minor | 5h 6m | |
| Sep 221:44 UTC | Elevated Linux worker queue times | minor | 21m | |
| Aug 2506:53 UTC | [Critical] Issue with Downloads | critical | 44m | |
| Aug 2015:40 UTC | We are investigating an issue where customers may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products in the us-west1 region. | critical | 3h 40m | |
| Aug 1812:58 UTC | INC20000163 | major | 1h 54m | |
| Aug 1713:19 UTC | No capacity in ARN | none | 2h 22m |
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