Multiple services are affected, service degradation
What happened
On Mar 5, 2026, between 16:24 UTC and 19:30 UTC, Actions was degraded. During this time, 95% of workflow runs failed to start within 5 minutes with an average delay of 30 minutes and 10% workflow runs failed with an infrastructure error. This was due to Redis infrastructure updates that were being rolled out to production to improve our resiliency. These changes introduced a set of incorrect configuration change into our Redis load balancer causing internal traffic to be routed to an incorrect host leading to two incidents. We mitigated this incident by correcting the misconfigured load balancer. Actions jobs were running successfully starting at 17:24 UTC. The remaining time until we closed the incident was burning through the queue of jobs. We immediately rolled back the updates that were a contributing factor and have frozen all changes in this area until we have completed follow-up work from this. We are working to improve our automation to ensure incorrect configuration changes are not able to propagate through our infrastructure. We are also working on improved alerting to catch misconfigured load balancers before it becomes an incident. Additionally, we are updating the Re
Timeline
- Resolved · Mar 5, 19:30 UTC
On Mar 5, 2026, between 16:24 UTC and 19:30 UTC, Actions was degraded. During this time, 95% of workflow runs failed to start within 5 minutes with an average delay of 30 minutes and 10% workflow runs failed with an infrastructure error. This was due to Redis infrastructure updates that were being rolled out to production to improve our resiliency. These changes introduced a set of incorrect configuration change into our Redis load balancer causing internal traffic to be routed to an incorrect host leading to two incidents. We mitigated this incident by correcting the misconfigured load balancer. Actions jobs were running successfully starting at 17:24 UTC. The remaining time until we closed the incident was burning through the queue of jobs. We immediately rolled back the updates that were a contributing factor and have frozen all changes in this area until we have completed follow-up work from this. We are working to improve our automation to ensure incorrect configuration changes are not able to propagate through our infrastructure. We are also working on improved alerting to catch misconfigured load balancers before it becomes an incident. Additionally, we are updating the Redis client configuration in Actions to improve resiliency to brief cache interruptions.
More from GitHub
Full history| Started | Incident | Impact | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 2310:11 UTC | Incident across several services | minor | Ongoing |
| Sep 2022:13 UTC | Incident with Pull Requests | minor | 1h 9m |
| Sep 1720:59 UTC | Elevated rate of errors for OpenAI models provided by Copilot | minor | 50m |
| Sep 1607:20 UTC | Degradation with Gemini 3.8 Flash | major | 10h 28m |
| Sep 1519:11 UTC | Disruption with some GitHub services | minor | 49m |
| Sep 1509:47 UTC | Disruption with some GitHub services | minor | 1h 30m |
Also caused by configuration change
All| Started | Vendor | Incident | Impact | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 2218:20 UTC | Phone Number APIs and Console Were Returning Incorrect 404 Responses | none | 0m | |
| Sep 1622:30 UTC | Hyperdrive Elevated Origin Connection Failure Rates | none | 0m | |
| Sep 1211:04 UTC | Some customers experiencing blurry image previews and download issues | minor | 8h 56m | |
| Sep 1107:18 UTC | INC20000213 | critical | 6h 1m | |
| Sep 407:34 UTC | INC20000199 | critical | 2h 36m | |
| Sep 109:58 UTC | INC20000190 | major | 3h 52m |
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