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GitHub · Developer toolsJul 14, 2026, 08:21 UTC

Disruption with some GitHub services

MinorCapacityUpdated 18h ago
Jul 14, 08:21 UTCJul 14, 09:56 UTC
Duration
1h 35m
Impact
Minor
Root cause
Capacity
GitHub, 90 days
68 incidents
Affected
Not listed by the vendor.
Status page

Final update

On July 14, 2026, the GitHub Codespaces service was degraded during two periods , between 06:00 UTC and 09:56 UTC, and again between 10:54 UTC and 12:53 UTC , and some users experienced intermittent failures or delays when creating new codespaces. Impact was concentrated in a subset of geographic regions. During the first period, the error rate averaged 0.5% and peaked at 4.6% of codespace creation requests. The second period was more pronounced, peaking at approximately 30% of codespace creation requests in the most-affected region before recovery. Both periods were caused by an unexpected surge in codespace creation from an abusive actor that drained the available compute capacity in the affected regions faster than it could be replenished. We mitigated the impact by identifying and stopping the sources of the excess creation volume, reducing the resources that could be consumed in the affected regions, and rebalancing traffic across regions to restore capacity. Codespace creation success rates returned to normal after each period. We are working to add automated, low-latency controls to throttle abnormal codespace creation and to strengthen our detection and safeguards, so w

Timeline

  1. Resolved · Jul 14, 09:56 UTC
    On July 14, 2026, the GitHub Codespaces service was degraded during two periods , between 06:00 UTC and 09:56 UTC, and again between 10:54 UTC and 12:53 UTC , and some users experienced intermittent failures or delays when creating new codespaces. Impact was concentrated in a subset of geographic regions. During the first period, the error rate averaged 0.5% and peaked at 4.6% of codespace creation requests. The second period was more pronounced, peaking at approximately 30% of codespace creation requests in the most-affected region before recovery. Both periods were caused by an unexpected surge in codespace creation from an abusive actor that drained the available compute capacity in the affected regions faster than it could be replenished. We mitigated the impact by identifying and stopping the sources of the excess creation volume, reducing the resources that could be consumed in the affected regions, and rebalancing traffic across regions to restore capacity. Codespace creation success rates returned to normal after each period. We are working to add automated, low-latency controls to throttle abnormal codespace creation and to strengthen our detection and safeguards, so we can reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this in the future.

More from GitHub

Full history
StartedIncidentDuration
Sep 2310:11 UTCIncident across several servicesOngoing
Sep 2022:13 UTCIncident with Pull Requests1h 9m
Sep 1720:59 UTCElevated rate of errors for OpenAI models provided by Copilot50m
Sep 1607:20 UTCDegradation with Gemini 3.8 Flash10h 28m
Sep 1519:11 UTCDisruption with some GitHub services49m
Sep 1509:47 UTCDisruption with some GitHub services1h 30m

Also caused by capacity and load

All
StartedIncidentDuration
Sep 2213:19 UTCWe are investigating an issue with CH servers in Azure germanywestcentral regionClickHouse5h 6m
Sep 221:44 UTCElevated Linux worker queue timesExpo21m
Aug 2506:53 UTC[Critical] Issue with DownloadsBox44m
Aug 2015:40 UTCWe are investigating an issue where customers may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products in the us-west1 region.Google Cloud3h 40m
Aug 1812:58 UTCINC20000163Snowflake1h 54m
Aug 1713:19 UTCNo capacity in ARNFly.io2h 22m

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