Disruption with some GitHub services
Final update
On July 14, 2026, the GitHub Codespaces service was degraded during two periods , between 06:00 UTC and 09:56 UTC, and again between 10:54 UTC and 12:53 UTC , and some users experienced intermittent failures or delays when creating new codespaces. Impact was concentrated in a subset of geographic regions. During the first period, the error rate averaged 0.5% and peaked at 4.6% of codespace creation requests. The second period was more pronounced, peaking at approximately 30% of codespace creation requests in the most-affected region before recovery. Both periods were caused by an unexpected surge in codespace creation from an abusive actor that drained the available compute capacity in the affected regions faster than it could be replenished. We mitigated the impact by identifying and stopping the sources of the excess creation volume, reducing the resources that could be consumed in the affected regions, and rebalancing traffic across regions to restore capacity. Codespace creation success rates returned to normal after each period. We are working to add automated, low-latency controls to throttle abnormal codespace creation and to strengthen our detection and safeguards, so w
Timeline
- Resolved · Jul 14, 09:56 UTC
On July 14, 2026, the GitHub Codespaces service was degraded during two periods , between 06:00 UTC and 09:56 UTC, and again between 10:54 UTC and 12:53 UTC , and some users experienced intermittent failures or delays when creating new codespaces. Impact was concentrated in a subset of geographic regions. During the first period, the error rate averaged 0.5% and peaked at 4.6% of codespace creation requests. The second period was more pronounced, peaking at approximately 30% of codespace creation requests in the most-affected region before recovery. Both periods were caused by an unexpected surge in codespace creation from an abusive actor that drained the available compute capacity in the affected regions faster than it could be replenished. We mitigated the impact by identifying and stopping the sources of the excess creation volume, reducing the resources that could be consumed in the affected regions, and rebalancing traffic across regions to restore capacity. Codespace creation success rates returned to normal after each period. We are working to add automated, low-latency controls to throttle abnormal codespace creation and to strengthen our detection and safeguards, so we can reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this in the future.
More from GitHub
Full history| Started | Incident | Impact | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 2310:11 UTC | Incident across several services | minor | Ongoing |
| Sep 2022:13 UTC | Incident with Pull Requests | minor | 1h 9m |
| Sep 1720:59 UTC | Elevated rate of errors for OpenAI models provided by Copilot | minor | 50m |
| Sep 1607:20 UTC | Degradation with Gemini 3.8 Flash | major | 10h 28m |
| Sep 1519:11 UTC | Disruption with some GitHub services | minor | 49m |
| Sep 1509:47 UTC | Disruption with some GitHub services | minor | 1h 30m |
Also caused by capacity and load
All| Started | Vendor | Incident | Impact | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 2213:19 UTC | We are investigating an issue with CH servers in Azure germanywestcentral region | minor | 5h 6m | |
| Sep 221:44 UTC | Elevated Linux worker queue times | minor | 21m | |
| Aug 2506:53 UTC | [Critical] Issue with Downloads | critical | 44m | |
| Aug 2015:40 UTC | We are investigating an issue where customers may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products in the us-west1 region. | critical | 3h 40m | |
| Aug 1812:58 UTC | INC20000163 | major | 1h 54m | |
| Aug 1713:19 UTC | No capacity in ARN | none | 2h 22m |
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