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GitHub · Developer toolsJul 29, 2026, 15:26 UTC

Incident with Actions

MajorCapacityUpdated 16h ago
Jul 29, 15:26 UTCJul 29, 16:00 UTC
Duration
34m
Impact
Major
Root cause
Capacity
GitHub, 90 days
68 incidents
Affected
Actions
Status page

Final update

On July 29, 2026, from 14:51 UTC to 15:28 UTC, GitHub Actions experienced elevated REST API request timeouts and errors, failures registering runners, and delayed workflow run starts for customers whose traffic was served by a single infrastructure site. This was caused by an under-provisioned internal Actions service in that site: under increased load its instances ran out of memory and became unresponsive, and because Actions API requests wait synchronously on that service, requests routed through the affected site stalled and timed out. During the incident, approximately 2% of workflows were delayed. Requests served by other sites remained unaffected. Both standard and larger hosted runners routed through the affected site could see delayed job starts. The issue was mitigated by scaling out the runner-administration service in the affected site and increasing the replica count, which restored API availability and returned workflow run starts to normal. We are working to add horizontal autoscaling, memory-saturation alerting, and scaling-forecast monitoring for this service, along with responder playbooks, to reduce the likelihood of similar issues in the future.

Timeline

  1. Resolved · Jul 29, 16:00 UTC
    On July 29, 2026, from 14:51 UTC to 15:28 UTC, GitHub Actions experienced elevated REST API request timeouts and errors, failures registering runners, and delayed workflow run starts for customers whose traffic was served by a single infrastructure site. This was caused by an under-provisioned internal Actions service in that site: under increased load its instances ran out of memory and became unresponsive, and because Actions API requests wait synchronously on that service, requests routed through the affected site stalled and timed out. During the incident, approximately 2% of workflows were delayed. Requests served by other sites remained unaffected. Both standard and larger hosted runners routed through the affected site could see delayed job starts. The issue was mitigated by scaling out the runner-administration service in the affected site and increasing the replica count, which restored API availability and returned workflow run starts to normal. We are working to add horizontal autoscaling, memory-saturation alerting, and scaling-forecast monitoring for this service, along with responder playbooks, to reduce the likelihood of similar issues in the future.
  2. Monitoring · Jul 29, 15:40 UTC
    The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
  3. Investigating · Jul 29, 15:34 UTC
    We are investigating an issue affecting GitHub Actions. Some customers may experience timeouts or failures with runner registration and workflow runs may be delayed during startup. Our team is actively working to mitigate the impact by scaling capacity across additional infrastructure.
  4. Investigating · Jul 29, 15:26 UTC
    We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Actions

More from GitHub

Full history
StartedIncidentDuration
Sep 2310:11 UTCIncident across several servicesOngoing
Sep 2022:13 UTCIncident with Pull Requests1h 9m
Sep 1720:59 UTCElevated rate of errors for OpenAI models provided by Copilot50m
Sep 1607:20 UTCDegradation with Gemini 3.8 Flash10h 28m
Sep 1519:11 UTCDisruption with some GitHub services49m
Sep 1509:47 UTCDisruption with some GitHub services1h 30m

Also caused by capacity and load

All
StartedIncidentDuration
Sep 2213:19 UTCWe are investigating an issue with CH servers in Azure germanywestcentral regionClickHouse5h 6m
Sep 221:44 UTCElevated Linux worker queue timesExpo21m
Aug 2506:53 UTC[Critical] Issue with DownloadsBox44m
Aug 2015:40 UTCWe are investigating an issue where customers may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products in the us-west1 region.Google Cloud3h 40m
Aug 1812:58 UTCINC20000163Snowflake1h 54m
Aug 1713:19 UTCNo capacity in ARNFly.io2h 22m

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