Incident with Pull Requests

What happened

On February 9, 2026, GitHub experienced two related periods of degraded availability affecting GitHub.com, the GitHub API, GitHub Actions, Git operations, GitHub Copilot, and other services. The first period occurred between 16:12 UTC and 17:39 UTC, and the second between 18:53 UTC and 20:09 UTC. In total, users experienced approximately 2 hours and 43 minutes of degraded service across the two incidents. During both incidents, users encountered errors loading pages on GitHub.com, failures when pushing or pulling code over HTTPS, failures starting or completing GitHub Actions workflow runs, and errors using GitHub Copilot. Additional services including GitHub Issues, pull requests, webhooks, Dependabot, GitHub Pages, and GitHub Codespaces experienced intermittent errors. SSH-based Git operations were not affected during either incident. Our investigation determined that both incidents shared the same underlying cause: a configuration change to a user settings caching mechanism caused a large volume of cache rewrites to occur simultaneously. During the first incident, asynchronous rewrites overwhelmed a shared infrastructure component responsible for coordinating background work, tr

1. Resolved · Feb 9, 17:40 UTC
   On February 9, 2026, GitHub experienced two related periods of degraded availability affecting GitHub.com, the GitHub API, GitHub Actions, Git operations, GitHub Copilot, and other services. The first period occurred between 16:12 UTC and 17:39 UTC, and the second between 18:53 UTC and 20:09 UTC. In total, users experienced approximately 2 hours and 43 minutes of degraded service across the two incidents. During both incidents, users encountered errors loading pages on GitHub.com, failures when pushing or pulling code over HTTPS, failures starting or completing GitHub Actions workflow runs, and errors using GitHub Copilot. Additional services including GitHub Issues, pull requests, webhooks, Dependabot, GitHub Pages, and GitHub Codespaces experienced intermittent errors. SSH-based Git operations were not affected during either incident. Our investigation determined that both incidents shared the same underlying cause: a configuration change to a user settings caching mechanism caused a large volume of cache rewrites to occur simultaneously. During the first incident, asynchronous rewrites overwhelmed a shared infrastructure component responsible for coordinating background work, triggering cascading failures. Increased load caused the service responsible for proxying Git operations over HTTPS to exhaust available connections, preventing it from accepting new requests. We mitigated this incident by disabling async cache rewrites and restarting the affected Git proxy service ac